Useful Art American Wesleyan Centennial
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Beyond the single enclosed arenas and facilities that add up to the London Olympic experience, will be a more open challenge – the Olympic Park. It is a widespread, open space that will be open for access to non-ticket-holding members of the public. People visiting the Park will not be subject to the identity and security controls exercised at point of ticket sale and at access to a venue. They will, however, be in close proximity to Games facilities and moving amid big numbers of people. This area will welcome a potentially big number of people, but will not have a queer schedule for entry and exit, nor any prescribed flow of motion – people will linger, perchance for hours in a chosen spot, bringing with them bags, foodstuffs, and spare clothing, and leaving some of these items lying around as they move away. Whilst largely innocent, the threat of more malicious action may be concealed in the debris. The goal to be attained is to make the Games safe, secure and a positive experience for all, yet there are some potential threats. Lessons learned from past experiences will come into play. For example, the lessons from the Centennial Park bombing at the Atlanta Games in 1996 are specially pertinent. Here, the limitations of communicating and connection amongst co-operating agencies were severe. Similarly, big gatherings for extended periods suffer other threats, and the experience of a widespread flu outbreak at the Nagano Winter Games in 1998 introduces another dimension to planning and response. Each event learns from prior experience as successes are reinforced and weaknesses addressed. A number of connected themes are present in the testimony of The Honorable Mitt Romney, Governor of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts at a Senate Competition, Foreign Commerce, and Infrastructure Hearing in May 2004, reflecting his experiences as Chairman of the Organising Committee of the Winter Games at Salt Lake City in 2002. Many of his points stay unfeigned as we prepare for the London Games in 2012. His themes include co-ordination amid entities with responsibility, both in the shelter and response areas; the importance of intelligence and communicating where numerous contributing agencies and bodies are collaborating; elaborate planning, early mobilisation and a large total of practice. These ideas are evenly valid for preparatory actions prior to the event and for command and control distinct features of managing the event in progress. Using tools and proficiencies of Enterprise Architecture Modelling of the end-to-end danger profile around the Olympic Park would extend existent preparatory actions into a more widespread collaboration amidst agencies and organisations. This could stimulate connected action to keep away from or better respond to the threats and aftermaths of incidents. Using a combining of classic peril management techniques, placed within an enterprise model of a venue, it will be possible to distinguish and manage risks in a more holistic way. There are galore parties involved in the preparation and staging of an event, and their interconnections and dependencies are seldom wholly understood or explored. This becomes more pressing when the complexity level rises as a result of numerous events occurring in parallel, and this complexity is stressed by events. It is possible to construct an enterprise model to represent a facility, the processes and flows through it, and the people and organisations involved. In this way, we may invent a model of the ‘system’ that is the Olympic Park and those that move through it. Similarly, events or incidents may be identified and their impacts assessed. These may be deliberate, malicious actions, or accidental co-incidence such as clustering of humans at a bottleneck passage. These events may be regarded as a stimulus to the system, and to which the scheme will respond as a series of causes and effects. If the system model is sufficiently wide-reaching we may see the effects of an incident – how it ripples through the venue and how organisers may co-ordinate response to best effect. Traditional danger management proficiencies will intention to distinguish the stimulus, valuate the chance of it occurring, quantify it is effects and prepare prevention, reduction, transfer, acceptance or contingency activenesses in order to respond. Typically, various danger management plans exist, but the scenario itself will hand off cause and effect among parts of the infrastructure or involved parties. Linking them together in a total view of the scheme offers a more inclusive view. A compound approach presents an end-to-end capacity for a co-ordinated view of the facility, accordingly enabling analysis all over the wider picture, and decision making with more outstanding selfassurance through clear or deep perception and understanding. This leads us neatly into a challenge of understanding. Such a complex collection of facilities, technology, processes and humane components is a little daunting. However, there are means by which we may capture elements of the problem, and piece by piece build up a picture that may help us to disentangle the problem. There are computer analysis and modelling proficiencies that will let us get closer, so what is theoretically possible? The Art of the Possible A static model We may capture characteristics to build a model of the Olympic Park environment. This is a static model containing data in regards to everything that is relevant. This amounts to whatsoever data is necessitated to evaluate and valuate risk scenarios. The model will capture details of physical things such as buildings, but not in the traditionalisti way of building a physical scale model. In this case, it is more when it comes to capturing selective information regarding the building. As a result, we may model a venue in terms of it is physical structure (facilities, access control, pathways), it is operational structure (organisations involved), and it is info structure (information regarding schedules, visitor numbers, events, etc.). A procedure model Against the backdrop of the physical or static model, we may imagine a set of scenarios (use cases) or routine models that represent the processes that need to be undertaken to manage the environment. This includes the roles involved (people, organisations etc.) and the processes they undertake, and allows the creation of maps that show relationships amidst organisations, roles and responsibilities, and info flows amongst roles. The significance of this evolution is that the models concede ‘dynamic’ analysis of scenarios as they modify over time. They concede us to see the effects of incidents as they unfold. A peril model This is the next layer of sophistication and requires the capacity to attach specified risks (with their probability and impact) to all constituents of the model. The result is a catalogue of possible threat events, with their prospects within a specified amount of time of time. All of the events that could occur in parallel would in all probability need to be represented in a good deal of way in the dynamic model. A veritably dynamic danger model will need to recognise the idea of a cause and effect chain – when one thing happens, there is a ripple effect of other things happening that may not have occurred by themselves or without that stimulus. The effect of a causal event would affect the probability of other events occurring, and this too may be captured and modelled. Static analysis of the peril model Recognising that we now have rather a complex model, understanding the risks may appear daunting. The evaluation of risks may be simplified in the basi analysis by limiting matters to an aggregate of the risks related with peculiar use cases. In effect, this freezes the risks with a starting condition of chance and impact, which is utile but not wholly precise as events move through time. Simulation of an event or incident could implicate changes in the chance of given risks occurring. The affect of those risk events that occur following a given event (or combining of events) could be assessed thru static analysis of the model. In this way, one could evaluate the overall peril profile of the model following an event. Dynamic simulation of the danger model using a robust rules engine Seeing the effect of an incident requires sophisticated systems known as exploitation tools to be capable to visualise those effects and reflect reality with a little more fidelity. For this to be effective and present usable output, there needs to be sufficient info in the architecture model to drive them. Obtaining all this selective information for all cases, and versus the unpredictable flows and arrival rates of people, would require some mathematically conveyed rules and a rule engine competent of simulating dissimilar scenarios for arrival, departures and movements amid facilities. Information on possible threat events would be those required as parameters of the rules engine, so that the effect of specified events on crowd movements within the specified facility could be assessed. Simulation of an event or incident could be linked to the parameters controlling the rules engine, so that resulting movements of persons could be visualised. At this point the complexity argument is in peril of circling back on itself as the tools to visualise a complex scenario are themselves growing ever more complex. This has the potential to render this type of analysis self-defeating. Expert analysts and architects believe that selective and sensible application of these tools may deliver outstanding advances in understanding of complex peril scenarios, and that this is worth the analysis and computing power required to construct the models. Using results to define roles that cover all danger responsibilities Risk management data would be generated as a result of either the static or dynamic analyses. Risk management plans would be modelled as a routine model linked to the roles that try them and the facilities they require. The effect of prevention, reduction and contingency actions would be to change the prospect of specified risks occurring, so the resultant model could be reassessed following introduction of these activities. The role definitions would then be complemented by a list of the processes within which the role is engaged and those that impacted upon it. This is quintessentially depicted using a RAIC matrix (Responsible, Accountable, Informed, Consulted) of roles and processes. Plan and run rehearsals The without doubt or question specified and validated set of role and danger management procedure definitions, combined with the dynamic danger model of all threat events and their consequences, provides the basis for planning and running rehearsals of reactions to given events. Real World Opportunities In theory it is possible to capture data regarding the venue, the organisations and people connected with it, the roles and data flows, plus the danger scenarios, and wrap them all up in a set of algorithms to predict and practise the outcomes to single or combinings of events occurring at the site. In the real world however, it is in all likelihood not as easy as all that. So, what is practically possible? Practicality is governed by the fixed time frame. A outstanding deal of work would be necessitated to establish a useable model available in time to plan and run a suitable set of assessments and rehearsals before 2012. Additionally, the engineering peril of a suitable rule engine and rules representing dissimilar scenarios for arrival, departures and movements of persons is yet to be explored. This does not mean it is too hard though, and the value of understanding even a little more than we do today ought to not be underestimated. A practical set of actions might include:
Problems and priorities of the practical solution If the rules-engine-based simulations were attempted, they ought to be employed only for planning and rehearsals. Any try to use them in real time to in truth control the Olympic Park must be vigorously rebuffed since the safety case for such an idea would be exceedingly fraught. People will have to be left to act (after rehearsals) according to their best judgement at the time. So, even if we may wholly perceive the cause and effect relationships, and visualise what might happen, there is no alternate for trained humans using their skill and judgement to manage the circumstance that lies before them. But for all of us, how a good deal of times do we feel more comfortable doing something we have done before? |



